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Abstract. We investigate the extension of Description Logics (DL) with a notion
of “substitution”. Substitutions naturally arise when reasoning about programs
which modify graph structures that are characterized by DLs. They constitute also
a means to express concept and role modifications such as addition or deletion of
individuals (respectively, pairs of individuals) to or from concepts (respectively,
roles). After a formal definition of substitutions, we conduct a systematic study
of a wide range of DLs with the purpose of proving or disproving conservativity
of an extension of the respective DL with substitutions. The resulting classifica-
tion is a gauge of the expressiveness of description logics and their adequacy for
reasoning about change of graph structures.
1 Introduction
Motivation: Description Logics (DLs) [3] constitute the main class of logics serving
as foundation of knowledge representation systems. They have been used for instance
as the underlying formal framework for graph and knowledge bases and corresponding
querying languages such as SPARQL [17] and OWL [14].
These logics differ by their expressive power and complexity1. Besides their static
descriptions, Knowledge bases may also be amenable to evolve. Such evolutions can
be the result of arbitrary programs. This paper has been motivated by the problem of
evolving KBs and the means that may be used to guarantee their formal descriptions.
Actually, by using a program logic following a Hoare style, see e.g. [4], one may prove
that a KB, say K, which satisfies an assertion Pre, can be modified by a program P
and the resulting KB, say K ′, satisfies an assertion Post.
One of the questions explored in this paper is therefore: which DLs that have proven
to be adequate for knowledge representation can also be used for reasoning about
change, particularly to specify assertions such as Pre and Post and the underlying
Hoare calculus? In other words, how do classical DLs behave when used in a Hoare
calculus where substitutions arise in the computation of assertions? Recall that to every
elementary action of a program P , is associated a substitution [10].
A result of this paper is that all the families of description logics considered here
can be extended to a decidable program logic, with the aid of substitutions. In some
cases, these substitutions are conservative (and can therefore be eliminated within the
⋆ This research has been supported by the Climt project (ANR-11-BS02-016)
1 see, e.g., http://www.cs.man.ac.uk/˜ezolin/dl/
logic itself), and in some cases, this is impossible. Providing rigorous proofs of this 
latter fact is one of the main aims of this paper.
Overview of the approach: Although DLs come in numerous flavors allowing to cater 
to diverse needs in term of expressiveness and complexity, they are tailored to represent 
”static” knowledge, that is to represent and reason about a given state of knowledge. 
The need for ways to make knowledge evolve has lead to an increasingly rich field of 
knowledge update and action [20,11].
The work presented in this paper is inspired by the desire to take advantage of 
notions of program verification.In a program verification framework, one would com-
pute the weakest precondition associated to a postcondition P ost, say wp(P rog, P ost). 
wp(P rog, P ost) would then be the condition that the original knowledge base has to 
satisfy to be sure that we reach a knowledge base satisfying the postcondition. Compu-
tation of weakest preconditions is done stepwise, starting from the postcondition and by 
considering the effect of each instruction starting from the last one and going back to the 
first instruction. The effect of an elementary instruction, say inst, on a postcondition, 
say Q, is reflected by a so-called substitution, say θ. Substitutions are classic and central 
elements of Hoare Logic and the most intuitive way in such a framework to translate 
into logic the effect of an action. Such an approach is quite unusual in the graph trans-
formations framework though and being able to effectively express substitutions in the 
case of such transformations is of utmost importance.
The task of proving the correctness of a program can thus, through the use of sub-
stitutions, be reduced to the task of determining whether or not a formula is valid. The 
main issue is that most logics for which there are results on the decidability or the com-
plexity of the validity problem do not explicitly consider substitutions as a constructor. 
The other way round, most logics with substitutions have received very little attention 
and there are thus few results on their validity problems.
Note that our goal is to inspect logics and classify them depending on whether or 
not adding substitutions to them modifies their expressive power. We do not claim to 
produce efficient ways to prove that a program is correct.
The paper is structured as follows: We recall in Sect. 2 different DLs starting from 
ALC and introduce their extensions with substitutions. In Sect. 3 , we provide a family 
of DLs which are closed under substitutions, whereas Sect. 4 shows that some other 
DLs are not closed under substitutions. Sect. 5 discusses the case of the logic ALCO 
and some of its extensions. We conclude in Sect. 6.
2 Syntax
In this section, we define the syntax of the description logics we consider. We start by 
the elementary logic ALC. ALC, and all of its extensions, are defined using a signature 
(C, R, I) where C is a set of concept names, R is a set of role names and I a set of 
individuals.
Definition 1 (ALC roles). The set of ALC-roles is R.
Definition 2 (ALC concepts). The set of ALC-concepts, C, is defined as:
C ::= ⊥ (empty concept) | A (concept name) | ¬ C (negation)
| C ⊓ C (conjunction) | ∃R.C (exists)
where c is a concept name (∈ C) and R is a role. As usual, ⊤ is used for ¬ ⊥, C ⊔ D
for ¬(¬C ⊓ ¬D) and ∀R.C for ¬∃R.¬C.
As an example, ∃R. (c ⊔ ∀R. c) is an ALC-concept satisfied by nodes having an
R-neighbour which satisfies c or whose R-neighbours satisfy c.
Concepts are the basic building block of DL formulae. Usually, the problem we are
interested in looks like: “Is concept C valid (or satisfiable) given some axioms?”. These
axioms are split into ABoxes and TBoxes.
Definition 3 (ABox and TBox). An individual assertion IA is defined as:
IA ::= a : C (concept assertion) | a = b (equality)
| a 6= b (inequality) | (a, b) : R (positive role assertion)
| (a, b) : ¬R (negative role assertion)
where C and D are concepts, R is a role and a and b are individuals. An ABox is a
finite set of individual assertions. A TBox is a finite set of concept inclusions of the form
C ⊑ D, where C and D are concepts.
Each extension of ALC we are going to focus on adds new concept or role con-
structors. Each constructor is associated to a letter added to the name of the logic2. The
constructors that we consider in this paper are Q, O, Self , I, @ and U , defined as
follows:
Q (≥ n R C) (at least) O {a} (nominal)
Self ∃S.Self (local reflexivity) I R− (inverse role)
@ @aC (concept assertion) U U (universal role)
where a is an individual, S is a role, different from U, R is a role and C is a concept.
(< n R C) is a shorter way to write ¬(≥ n R C).
From now on, as there are numerous logics that are considered, we will introduce
new notations. ALCL1 . . .Ln[Ln+1 . . .Lm] denotes the family of description logics
with all constructors corresponding to L1 . . .Ln and any combination of those corre-
sponding to Ln+1 . . .Lm.
Definition 4 (Interpretation). An interpretation I is a pair {∆I, ·I} where ∆I is the
universe (set of elements) and ·I, the valuation, is a function that maps each concept
name to a subset of ∆I, each role name to a subset of ∆I ×∆I and each individual to
an element of ∆I.
Below, we define the valuation of roles and concepts:
⊥I = ∅ (¬ C)I = ∆I\CI, written CI
(C ⊓ D)I = CI ∩DI (U)I = ∆I ×∆I
(∃R.C)I = {δ ∈ ∆I|#(RI
C
(δ)) ≥ 1} {a}I = {aI}
(∃R.Self)I = {δ ∈ ∆I|(δ, δ) ∈ RI} (@aC)
I = ∆I if aI ∈ CI
(≥ n R C)I = {δ ∈ ∆I|#(RI
C
(δ)}) ≥ n} ∅ otherwise
(R−)I = {(δ, δ′) ∈ ∆I ×∆I|(δ′, δ) ∈ RI}
2 see, e.g., http://www.cs.man.ac.uk/˜ezolin/dl/
where RI
C
(δ) is {δ′ ∈ ∆|(δ, δ′) ∈ RI ∧ δ′ ∈ CI} and #(V ) stands for the cardinal of
V .
Definition 5 (Model). We say that an interpretation I satisfies an assertion a : C
(resp. a = b, a 6= b, (a, b) : R, (a, b) : ¬R) if aI ∈ CI (resp. aI = bI, aI 6= bI,
(aI, bI) ∈ RI, (aI, bI) 6∈ RI). We say that an interpretation I is a model of an ABox
A if I satisfies all the assertions ofA. We say that an interpretation I satisfies a concept
inclusion C ⊑ D if CI ⊆ DI. We say that an interpretation I is a model of a TBox
T if I satisfies all the concept inclusions of T . We say that an interpretation I satisfies
a concept C if CI 6= ∅.
Now we introduce the notion of substitution that allows one to modify the valuation
of concepts and roles by adding or removing elements.
Definition 6 (Substitution). Given a role name R, a concept name c and individuals a
and b, a substitution θ is defined as follows:
θ ::= ǫ (empty substitution)
| R := R− (a, b) (deletion of role instance)
| R := R+ (a, b) (insertion of role instance)
| A := A− a (deletion of concept instance)
| A := A+ a (insertion of concept instance)
Substitutions define an additional concept constructor. We use σ in logic names to
signify that substitutions are allowed as constructors. It is important to note that this
constructor can only be used to build the concept part of the considered formulae and
not in assertions nor in concept inclusions.
Definition 7 (Lσ concepts). Given a logic L, the set of Lσ-concepts, C, is defined as:
C ::= L (concept of L)
Cθ (explicit substitution)
where L is a concept of L and θ is a substitution.
For instance, C[R := R + (a, b)] means that C is satisfied after adding the pair
(a, b) to the valuation of R. The interpretation is thus modified accordingly.
Definition 8 (Valuation of explicit substitutions). Let A be a concept name, a and b
be individuals, C be a concept and R be a role name, the valuation of explicit substitu-
tions is defined as follows:
– (Cǫ)I = CI
– (C[A := A + a])I = CK where ∆K = ∆I, ∀B ∈ C, B 6= A,BK = BI,
∀R ∈ R, RK = RI, ∀o ∈ I, oK = oI and AK = AI ∪ {aI}.
– (C[A := A − a])I = CK where ∆K = ∆I, ∀B ∈ C, B 6= A,BK = BI,
∀R ∈ R, RK = RI, ∀o ∈ I, oK = oI and AK = AI ∩ {aI}
– (C[R := R+(a, b)])I = CK where ∆K = ∆I, ∀A ∈ C, AK = AI, ∀P ∈ R, P 6=
R,PK = P I, ∀o ∈ I, oK = oI and RK = RI ∪ {(aI, bI)}
– (C[R := R−(a, b)])I = CK where ∆K = ∆I, ∀A ∈ C, AK = AI, ∀P ∈ R, P 6=
R,PK = P I, ∀o ∈ I, oK = oI and RK = RI ∩ {(aI, bI)}
The definition of the valuation for roles and concepts are conserved.
For instance, the valuation of (≥ 3 R C)[C := C + a][R := R − (b, d)] is
{δ ∈ ∆|#({δ′ ∈ ∆|(δ, δ′) ∈ RL ∧ δ′ ∈ CK}) ≥ 3} where CK = CI ∪ {aI} and
RL = RI ∩ {(bI, dI)}.
In this paper, we are interested in how the addition of substitutions to concepts
affects the expressive power of a given Description Logic. For now, explicit substitu-
tions can only be used in the definition of a concept (and thus are forbidden in ABoxes
and TBoxes). To be more precise, ABoxes and TBoxes are usually allowed but their
treatment is not what we are interested in. The reason why it is so is that, in the most
expressive logics we consider, they can be simulated into the concept itself. For the
least expressive logics, we look at whether or not allowing substitutions in ABoxes and
TBoxes is sufficient to close the gap between the logics with and without substitutions.
To be able to evaluate the expressiveness of a logic, we define an equivalence rela-
tion on logics.
Definition 9 (Equivalence). Two concepts C and D are said to be equivalent if, for
every interpretation I, CI = DI. A logic L1 is at most as expressive as a logic L2 wrt.
concepts written L1 ≤C L2 if every concept in L1 has an equivalent concept in L2.
Two logics L1 and L2 are concept-equivalent if L1 ≤C L2 and L2 ≤C L1.
Definition 10 (Closure under substitutions). A logic L is said to be closed under sub-
stitutions if L and Lσ are concept-equivalent.
3 DLs Closed under Substitutions
In this section we prove that DLs in ALCUO[QI@Self ] are closed under substitu-
tions. Let us notice first that in ALCQUIO@Self some constructs are rendundant. In
particular, when a DL includes O (nominals), assertions can be rewritten as concept in-
clusions. When a DL includes U (universal role), concept inclusions can be rewritten as
mere concepts. Additionally, as the concept @aC is equivalent to the assertion a : C,
all @-concepts can be removed in presence of both O and U . Finally, in presence of
both O and @, all ABox assertions can be rewritten as concepts.
As both O and U are part of ALCQUIO@Self , we consider for this chapter that
the TBox and the ABox are empty.
Theorem 1. ALCQUIO@Self is closed under substitutions.
The proof of Theorem 1 is done by providing a terminating rewriting system con-
sisting of rules which translate concepts of ALCQUIO@Selfσ into concepts of
ALCQUIO@Self (without substitutions). The idea is to associate to each possible
concept constructorΦ coupled with a substitution constructor σ an equivalent substitution-
free concept Φ′. The rules thus have the form: Φσ  Ψ . Ψ is a concept of
ALCQUIO@Selfσ equivalent to Φσ such that substitutions are applied to “simpler”
concepts. The rules are made so that they are orthogonal, thus ensuring that the rewriting
system is confluent. Furthermore, we have shown that the considered rules constitute a
terminating rewrite system. Therefore each formula Φσ rewrites to a unique substitution
free normal form Φ′ (Φσ  ∗ φ′).
Reporting all rules in here would be burdensome. Thus, to illustrate our point, we
give the example of a rule Φσ  Ψ for the ALCQUIO@Selfσ-concept where the
left-hand side Φσ is such that φ = (≥ n R C) and σ = [R := R − (a, b)]. The
right-hand side Ψ of the rule is a concept equivalent to Φσ, that is to say a concept such
that for every node µ, µ satisfies Ψ iff µ satisfies (≥ n R C)[R := R − (a, b)]. A
possible concept for Ψ is given below :
(({a} ⊓ ∃U.({b} ⊓ C[R := R− (a, b)]) ⊓ ∃R.{b})⇒
(≥ (n+ 1) R C[R := R− (a, b)]))
⊓ ((¬{a} ⊔ ∀U.(¬{b} ⊔ ¬C[R := R− (a, b)]) ⊔ ∀R.¬{b})⇒
(≥ n R C[R := R− (a, b)])).
– If the current node is a and b is an R-neighbour of a satisfying C[R := R− (a, b)]
(that is if {a} ⊓ ∃U.({b} ⊓C[R := R− (a, b)]) ⊓ ∃R.{b} is satisfied), then a will
actually lose exactly one R-neighbour satisfying C after the substitution and it will
thus have at least n remaining R-neighbours satisfying C after the substitution if it
had at least n+ 1 before and thus (≥ (n+ 1) R C[R := R− (a, b)]).
– If either the current node is not a, b does not satisfy C[R := R − (a, b)] or b is not
an R-neighbour (that is if ¬{a}⊔∀U.(¬{b}⊔¬C[R := R− (a, b)])⊔∀R.¬{b} is
satisfied) then the removal of the edge (a, b) from R doesn’t affect the current node
and thus (≥ n R C[R := R− (a, b)]) must be satisfied.
By following the same proof technique used for Theorem 1, we can show that the
following DLs are also closed under substitutions.
Corollary 1. The logics of ALCUO[QI@Self ] are closed under substitutions.
One can easily see from the one rule presented that the rewriting system risks caus-
ing an exponential blow-up in the size of the concept whose satisfiability is tested. In 
a worst case scenario, this could change the complexity of the satisfiability problem to 
2NEXPTIME.
Another noteworthy observation is that the constructors @ and U are both used to 
access remote nodes. A quick check of the rules shows that all occurrences of U in T 
are of the form ∃U.({a} ⊓ C) or ∀U.(¬{a} ⊔ C) which are both equivalent to @aC. 
Hence:
Corollary 2. The logics of ALCO@[QISelf ] are closed under substitutions.
4 DLs Not Closed under Substitutions
In this section, we give a family of Description Logics which are strictly less expressive 
than their extension with substitutions. In addition to the purely technical interest of 
sorting logics depending on whether or not they have the property of being closed un-
der substitutions, studying less expressive logics is meaningful as the more expressive 
logics are known to have a greater complexity[18]. Moreover, the translation removing 
substitutions is itself exponential which makes the problem clearly intractable.
We first consider the Description Logic ALC. ALC does not contain O nor U or
@, thus ABoxes and TBoxes need to be used. Yet, we still require that no substitution
appears in them.
Theorem 2. ALC is not closed under substitutions.
More formally, to prove that the addition of substitutions to ALC strictly increases
its expressiveness, we use a result from [6]:
Theorem 3. For every concept C of the logic ALC, for every two interpretations I1
and I2, for every bisimulation relation Z between I1 and I2, if an element x1 of I1
satisfies C and there is an element x2 of I2 such that x1Zx2, then x2 satisfies C. The
same can be said for the satisfiability of ABox and TBox assertions.
Definition 11 (Bisimulation). Given a signature (C, R, I) and two interpretations I1
and I2, a non-empty binary relation Z ⊆ (∆
I
1 ×∆
I
2) is a bisimulation if it satisfies:
(ALC1) d1Zd2 =⇒ for all A ∈ C, (d1 ∈ A
I1 ⇔ d2 ∈ A
I2)
(ALC2) For all R ∈ R, (d1Zd2 ∧ d1R
I1e1 =⇒ ∃e2.d2R
I2e2 ∧ e1Ze2)
(ALC3) For all R ∈ R, (d1Zd2 ∧ d2R
I2e2 =⇒ ∃e1.d1R
I1e1 ∧ e1Ze2)
(ALC4) For all a ∈ I, a
I1ZaI2
The idea of the proof of Theorem 2 consists in building an interpretation I1 such
that an ALC-concept C containing substitutions holds and I2 bisimilar to I1 where C
does not hold, thus proving that ALC is not as expressive as ALCσ. Fig. 1 depicts such
interpretations.
Let’s check that I1 and I2 are bisimilar. As the only concept in C is A and R is
empty, we verify the four axioms given in Def 11:
(ALC1) d1Zd3  (d1 ∈ A
I1 ⇔ d3 ∈ A
I2)X ALC2 R = ∅ X.
d2Zd3  (d2 ∈ A
I1 ⇔ d3 ∈ A
I2)X (ALC2 R = ∅ X.
(ALC3) R = ∅ X. (ALC4) a
I1ZaI2X
So I1 and I2 are bisimilar.
However, after the removal of the individual a from the concept A, the concept A
still holds in d2 and does not hold in d3. This shows that there is no equivalent concept
to A[A := A − a] in ALC, which is enough to show that ALC is not closed under
substitution.
One could wonder whether it is possible to find a way, using a TBox and an ABox to
find something that would be equivalent to A[A := A − a] in ALC. As the signature is 
({A}, ∅, {a}), there are only few choices available as individual assertions or concept 
inclusions. A rapid analyses of these choices shows that there is no way to build an 
ABox nor a TBox that would provide an equivalent for A[A := A − a].
In [6], one may find other definitions of bisimulations for various Description Log-
ics used to show that DL-concepts are stable. Below, we recall briefly these definitions. 
The names of the axioms indicate which logic they apply to. For instance, if one wants 
to deal with ALCUI, one has to use axioms (ALC1), (ALC2), (ALC3), (ALC4), (U1),
(U2), (I1) and (I2) to define bisimulations.
(U1) For all d ∈ ∆I1 , there exists d′ ∈ ∆I2 .dZd′
(U2) For all d
′ ∈ ∆I2 , there existsd ∈ ∆I1 .dZd′
(I1) For all R ∈ R, (d1Zd2 ∧ d1R
−I1e1 =⇒ there exists e2.d2R
−I2e2 ∧ e1Ze2)
(I2) For all R ∈ R, (d1Zd2 ∧ d2R
−I2e2 =⇒ there exists e1.d1R
−I1e1 ∧ e1Ze2)
(O) For all a ∈ I, d1Zd2 =⇒ (d1 = a
I1 ⇔ d2 = a
I2)
(Q) For all R ∈ R, (d1Zd2 =⇒ there is a bijection h : {y|(d1, y) ∈ R
I1} →
{y′|(d2, y
′) ∈ RI2} such that h ⊆ Z.
(IQ) For all R ∈ R, (d1Zd2 =⇒ there is a bijection h : {y|(y, d1) ∈ R
I1} →
{y′|(y′, d2) ∈ R
I2} such that h ⊆ Z.
(Self ) For all R ∈ R, d1Zd2 =⇒ (d1R
I1d1 ⇔ d2R
I2d2).
One could see that there is no rule for @. Actually, it is easy to prove that (ALC4)
is enough for @.
The same example allows to prove that the DLs given in the following corollary are
not closed under substitutions. The reader may verify that the axioms of bisimulations
corresponding to these logics are satisfed by Z.
Corollary 3. The logics of ALC[U@IQSelf ] are not closed under substitutions.
If a DL contains O, the example of Fig. 1 no longer is a counter-example because
Z is not a bisimulation anymore. Indeed d2Zd3 but d3 = a
I2 whereas d2 6= a
I2
contradicting (O).
I1 I2
d1 : a d2 d3 : a
Fig. 1. On the left, I1 is a model of A[A := A − a]. On the right, I2 is not. Nodes satisfying A 
are drawn in red. Dashed arrows represent Z. The signature is ({A}, ∅, {a}).
Up to now, in this section, we have considered that the only part of the logic where 
substitutions where allowed was the concept whose satisfiability or validity we wanted 
to prove. Usually, the problem when DLs are considered is not the satisfiability or the 
validity of a concept, though, but whether or not the association of an ABox and a TBox 
can yield a model.
Another interesting question then is whether or not, for an ABox and a TBox both 
possibly containing substitutions, it is possible to find a equivalent couple ABox-TBox 
without substitutions. It is not. Indeed, the ABox (a : A)[A := A+b] is satisfied in only 
two possible cases: either a : A before the substitution occurs or a = b. None of these 
two cases can be expressed using TBox assertions and, using an ABox, you can only 
express them as a Boolean ABox[19], which is not usually allowed, or using a nominal.
5 The case of ALCO
The technique we used in the previous section cannot be applied directly in the case of 
the logic ALCO. Indeed, we can show the following result.
Theorem 4. ALCOσ concepts are stable under ALCO-bisimulations.
To show this theorem, we assume given two interpretations I1 = {∆
I1 , .I1} and
I2 = {∆
I2 , .I2}, x1 ∈ ∆
I1 and x2 ∈ ∆
I2 , Z an ALCO-bisimulation between I1 and
I2 such that x1 Z x2 and prove for any ALCOσ-concept C, x1 ∈ C
I1 ⇔ x2 ∈ C
I2 .
As the complete proof is quite long, only a summary will be reported here.
We will mostly reuse the rewriting system intropduced in Sect. 3. Given anALCOσ-
concept, the rules for atomic concepts give an equivalent ALCO-concept which is in-
variant for ALCO-bisimulations.
For the other rules, we will reason by induction. We assume that the concept whose
invariance we want to show is (C ⊔D)θ. The correct translation is Cθ ⊔Dθ. Let’s prove 
that x1 ∈ (Cθ ⊔ Dθ)I1 ⇒ x2 ∈ (Cθ ⊔ Dθ)I2 . We know that x1 ∈ (Cθ ⊔ Dθ)I1 . That 
is, x1 ∈ (Cθ)I1 or x1 ∈ (Dθ)I1 . Then, by induction, x2 ∈ (Cθ)I2 or x2 ∈ (Dθ)I2 . 
Thus x2 ∈ (Cθ ⊔ Dθ)I2 . The same way, we can show that x2 ∈ (Cθ ⊔ Dθ)I2 ⇒ x1 ∈ 
(Cθ ⊔ Dθ)I1 . Showing (C ⊓ D)θ and (¬D)θ are invariant is done mutatis mutandis.
The concepts using the constructors ∃ and ∀ are handled by going back to the defini-
tion of the interpretations and bisimulations. Let’s prove that (∃R.C)[R := R+(a, b)] is 
invariant for ALCO-bisimulations. Once again, we start assuming x1 ∈ ((∃R.C)[R := 
R+(a, b)])I1 . That means x1 ∈ {y | ∃z such that (y, z) ∈ (R[R := R+(a, b)])I1 ∧z ∈ 
(C[R := R + (a, b)])I1 }. Then, by replacing (R[R := R + (a, b)])I1 by its expres-
sion, one gets x1 ∈ {y | ∃z such that (y, z) ∈ (R ∪ {(a, b)})I1 ∧ z ∈ (C[R := 
R + (a, b)])I1 }. Thus, x1 ∈ {y | ∃z such that (y, z) ∈ RI1 ∧ z ∈ (C[R := R + 
(a, b)])I1 }∪{aI1 , bI1 ∈ (C[R := R+(a, b)])I1 }. As x1 belongs to at least one of those 
sets: either there exists z1 ∈ ∆1 such that (x1, z1) ∈ RI1 ∧z1 ∈ (C[R := R+(a, b)])I1 
which means that, by (ALC3), there exists z2 ∈ ∆2 such that (x2, z2) ∈ RI2 and, by 
induction, z2 ∈ (C[R := R + (a, b)])I2 . Thus x2 ∈ ((∃R.C)[R := R + (a, b)])I2 , 
or x1 = aI1 and bI1 ∈ (C[R := R+(a, b)])I1 which means that, by (O), x2 = aI2 and, 
by induction, bI2 ∈ (C[R := R + (a, b)])I2 . Thus x2 ∈ ((∃R.C)[R := R + (a, b)])I2 .
The exact same reasoning can be done in the other direction to prove that this is an 
equivalence.
Theorem 4 could lead us to think that the addition of substitutions to ALCO does 
not increase the expressiveness of the logic. This is not true. We propose below another 
kind of binary relations that are able to distinguish between ALCO and ALCOσ. The 
only difference is the last axiom (rALC4). To put it simply, it checks that the interpre-
tation agree on the connected subgraph containing the root instead of agreeing on all 
connected subgraphs containing at least one nominal.
Definition 12. Given two interpretations I1 and I2, a rooted-bisimulation between I1 
and I2 rooted in (x,x′) is a binary relation Z ⊆ (∆I1 × ∆I2 ) such that:
(ALC1) d1Zd2 =⇒ for all A ∈ C, (d1 ∈ AI1 ⇔ d2 ∈ AI2 )
(ALC2) For all R ∈ R, (d1Zd2 ∧ d1RI1 e1 =⇒ ∃e2.d2RI2 e2 ∧ e1Ze2)
(ALC3) For all R ∈ R, (d1Zd2 ∧ d2RI2 e2 =⇒ ∃e1.d1RI1 e1 ∧ e1Ze2)
(rALC4) xZx′
This definition is extended for logics containing ALC the same way as the definition of 
bisimulations.
Definition 13. A concept C is stable under rooted-bisimulations if, for any interpre-
tations I1, I2, any rooted-bisimulation Z between I1, I2 rooted in (x,x
′) and any y
reachable from x, there exists y′ such that yZy′ and y ∈ CI1 ⇔ y′ ∈ CI2 .
Theorem 5. ALCO-concepts are stable under rooted-bisimulations
Once again, the proof is done by induction on the length of the concepts. It is obvi-
ous for concept names due to rule (ALC) and for nominals due to rule (O).
Theorem 6. ALCOσ-concepts are not stable under rooted-bisimulations.
Fig. 2 provides a counter-example illustrating Theorem 6. The results of Theorems 5
and 6 can be extended to the logics in ALCO[IQSelf ].
Let’s check that I1 and I2 are (d1,d3)-bisimilar. As the only concept in C is A and
there is no role in R, we verify the four axioms given in Def 12:
(ALC1) d1Zd3  (d1 ∈ A
I1 ⇔ d3 ∈ A
I2)X (ALC2)] R = ∅ X.
(ALC3) R = ∅ X. (rALC4) d
I1
1 Zd
I2
3 X
(O) d1Zd3  d1 = a
I1 ⇔ d3 = a
I2X
So I1 and I2 are (d1,d3)-bisimilar.
I1 I2
d1 : ad2 : b d3 : a d4 : b
Fig. 2. On the left, I1 is a model of (∀R.A)[R := R + (a, b)]. On the right, I2 is not. Nodes 
satisfying A are drawn in red. Dashed arrows represent Z. The signature is {{A}, ∅, {a, b}}. I1 
and I2 are (d1, d3)-rooted-bisimilar.
Theorem 7. ALCO is not closed under substitutions.
Even in the presence of ABoxes and TBoxes, ALCO is still not closed under sub-
stitutions. Indeed, no ABox or TBox allows to express the concept ({a} ∧ ∃R.A)[R := 
R + (a, b)] as it can only express one of the two possible “templates” of models at a 
time: the concept {a} ∧ ∃R.A is satisfied or the concept {a} together with the ABox 
b : A is satisfied. It is possible to express any of the two alone, the intersection of the 
two but not their union, which is the one we are looking for.
Once again, one may want to look at the problem of whether or not there exist an 
equivalent couple ABox-TBox without substitutions for any ABox-Tbox with substitu-
tions. Once again, it is not possible. The ABox assertion a : (∃R.A)[R := R + (a, b)] 
yields the same possible models given previously. Once more the solution would be to 
use a Boolean ABox [19] to be closed under substitutions.
6 Related Work and Conclusion
We tackled the problem of adding substitutions to concepts in various DLs. We have 
described different situations where substitutions increase the expressive power of DLs 
and where they do not. In the latter situations, proving concept satisfiability in presence 
of substitutions can be carried out using the same proof procedures tailored for DLs 
without substitutions. However, when the expressive power of the logics are altered by 
substitutions, new proof procedures are to be devised. We have shown that the most 
expressive logics we considered are closed under substitutions. Moreover, as they allow 
to define the Abox and the Tbox directly as a part of the concept, it is possible to 
represent this way knowledge representation bases. On the other hand, logics without 
nominals, are strictly extended with the introduction of substitutions. Adding Abox 
or Tbox assertions is not enough to cover the gap in expressiveness either. Finally, 
logics with nominals are a borderline case where there is no equivalent formula without 
substitutions allowing to express the formula with substitutions but it is possible to find 
a disjunction of such formulae. A solution, that we didn’t consider here, for these logics 
would be to allow role constructors that would be the union and difference of roles.
This paper presents a systematic study of the closure under substitutions of various 
families of DLs. We are not aware of similar work in the literature.
This paper only concentrates on DLs. There are other approaches to deal with graph 
or pointer transforming programs, such as separation logic [16], which are to a large 
extent orthogonal to our approach (also see [5]), or Pale [13] based on monadic second-
order logic, requiring a tree-shaped backbone to be identified in graphs.
DLs have been investigated in various areas with dynamic structures. For instance, 
Dynamic Description Logics [21] combine description logics with a PDL-style action 
language, with unspecified elementary actions, whereas in our case, we concentrate on 
a specific set of primitives .
Knowledge update is a field that has been widely studied be it as database update 
[20,7] or in the more philosophical epistemic logic[2,11].
In [12], the authors study the effects of elementary updates on sets of ABox formu-
lae. As updates and substitutions look differently at the actions, their results and ours 
differ even though the topics are related.
Only few approaches use action languages with updates in the form of substitutions.
[4] use a full programming language (including loops), where updates are restricted to 
elementary positive or negative concept and role expressions.
[1] uses a simpler update language (not containing loops), but updates may contain 
complex concept and role expressions. This provides a logic that could be used for 
verification of graph transformations since the logic is closed under substitutions.
Last but not least, Hoare style program verification for graph transformation has al-
ready been proposed in the literature (see, e.g., [15,8]). The investigated logics are often 
dialects of nested graph condition [9] which are more expressive than the DLs consid-
ered in the present paper. Our aim is not to achieve high expressivity, but investigate 
which reasoning principles can be implemented soundly with less complex logics.
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